User loginNavigation |
The Philosophy of SpeciesMassimo Pigliucci writes about the species problem in the latest issue of Philosophy Now (via the Uneasy Chair):
Dave Roberts at the Gristmill argues that though our methods of categorization are many, they are not essentialist, since they don’t correspond to “bright, unambiguous […] lines of separation” built into the natural world. From a philosophical perspective I believe he's correct, but unfortunately his insight doesn’t move us toward a solution of the problem of species; it actually further confuses classification. Humans create artificial categories where natural (essential) categories do not exist – we draw bold lines through the shades of gray that lie between black and white. We do this to better understand the world around us. The concept of ‘species’ is of itself artificial; Linnaean taxonomy relies on seven levels of classification for organisms, and yet we still need to attach ‘sub-’ and ‘super-’ to many of these in order to better understand the evolutionary relationships between organisms. Modern cladistics improves slightly on this model by relying less heavily on a set number of taxonomic levels, but still divides groups of organisms into artificial categories called “clades.” In the original article Pigliucci cites Ludwig Wittgenstein in an attempt to provide a more flexible (and thus more realistic) alternative to the way we approach taxonomy. I’m not an evolutionary biologist, but to me his proposed system of classification sounds prohibitively complex at best. As I said above, we simplify in order to understand; it’s like lowering the resolution of an image in order to fit it on your computer screen – incredibly high resolution sounds nice, but what use is it if the picture is too big for you to even tell what you’re looking at? |
Quick SearchRecent Active Topics |