No one thought that it would happen without the United States' involvement, but tomorrow the Kyoto Protocol will go into effect. It sounds like a blessing, and perhaps it is, but no one can deny that Kyoto's effectiveness will be seriously impaired by the United States' refusal to participate (since the U.S. is responsible for about 24% of the global greenhouse gas emissions). As it stands, Kyoto only calls for GHG emissions cutbacks that amount to a 5% reduction among participating industrialized countries by 2012. Overall, this is less than a 2% reduction in total global emissions. Compare this to the 40-60% reduction that many climate scientists have suggested is necessary to keep the global temperature increase below 2°C.

Other criticisms of Kyoto include the fact that it doesn't presently require cutbacks by developing nations; that it relies too much on draconian emissions cuts instead of market-based incentives; that it relies too much on market-based incentives instead of draconian emissions cuts; that its targets are too low or too high; and that its emissions goals simply will not be reached. Today I will level only a single criticism at the Kyoto Protocol: that it failed to elicit the support of the United States.

The U.S cited the first item in the above list as its reason for not participating – developing countries like China, India, and Mexico, the Bush administration argued, are some of the world's biggest polluters with respect to greenhouse gasses, and yet they are exempt from emissions reduction under Kyoto. This perspective became policy with the Senate's 95-0 passage of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which forbade the United States from participating in any international climate treaty that did not require emissions cuts from developing countries as well as industrial nations.

The argument that industrial nations ought to pull their own weight has obvious merit, but it is also important to ask, if Kyoto did require emissions cuts from developing nations, would they have sufficient incentive to participate? Also worthy of consideration is whether their exemption from emissions cuts in this first commitment period is a reasonable excuse for the United States' withdrawal. Neither of these are simple questions, but both are beyond the scope of what I intended to cover when I sat down to write this piece. I suggest that if you have something to say with regard to either of these topics, you register and blog it. I'll happily join the discussion.

Fortunately, Kyoto will govern international climate policy only until 2012, which means that negotiations for a follow-up treaty will begin somewhere around the time that the current administration will be leaving office. American participation in the post-Kyoto climate regime will likely be dependent upon three factors: (1) the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol as operationalized by the ability of currently participating nations to meet their Kyoto obligations, (2) the degree to which the impacts of global warming have become immediately apparent by 2012 (in other words, how much worse things have gotten), and (3) the politics of the administration that succeeds the Bush administration.

If (1) and (2) together are significant, (3) may matter less. Conversely, the outcome of (3) might be sufficient to trump (1) and (2), for better or for worse. We cannot count on the success of Kyoto or the effects of climate change to help create a stronger climate treaty in 2013, though we should hope for both Kyoto's success and minimal impact from the changing climate. However, American readers absolutely can have an impact on the makeup of the U.S. government, and this opportunity starts as early as the congressional elections in 2006.